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The  scholarly  debate  around  ‘global  land  grabbing’  is advancing  theoretically,  methodologically  and
empirically.  This  study  contributes  to these  ongoing  efforts  by  investigating  a set of ‘small-scale  land
acquisitions’  in  the  context  of  a recent  boom  in banana  plantation  investments  in Luang  Namtha  Province,
Laos.  In relation  to the  actors,  scales  and processes  involved,  the  banana  acquisitions  differ  from  the  state-
granted  large-scale  land  acquisitions  dominating  the  literature  on  ‘land  grabbing’  in Laos.  Starting  from
the experience  of  a rural  village  in Laos,  where  two  Chinese  banana  investors  leased  land  on  six-year  con-
tracts  in  2010,  we trace  the strategies  employed  by  the  investors  to  gain  access  to  the  land,  the  experience
of the  villagers  in  the  process  and  the  outcome  of  the  acquisitions  in terms  of land  use  change.  The  ﬁndings
reveal  how  the  investors  established  networks  of  local  middlemen  who  facilitate  negotiations  over  land
directly  at the  village  level,  thus  enabling  them  to  circumvent  any  formal  involvement  of  government
authorities.  The  informal  acquisition  process  also  ensured  a rapid  and  successful  implementation  of  the
plantations  with  consequent  land  use change,  including  the  destruction  of  ﬁeld structures,  plot  borders
and  irrigation  systems,  as  well  as erosion  and  heavy  chemical  input.  Drawing  upon  the  literature  on
‘powers  of  exclusion’  and  ‘control  grabbing’,  the  paper  argues  that  despite  the  apparent  small-scale  and
short-term  nature  of  these  leases,  the  forceful  acquisition  strategies  pursued  by the  investors  coupled
with  the  rapid  land  use conversion  and  associated  cultivation  practices  results  in strong  and  longer-term
alienation  of  land  from  the local  communities  involved.  This  implies  the  need  to  take  these  more  informal
forms of land  acquisitions  into  account  when  designing  policies  to address  the  negative  implications  of
land  grabbing  in  Laos  and  elsewhere.
©  2016  Elsevier  Ltd. All  rights  reserved.. Introduction
The ﬁrst media reports on ‘transnational land deals’ or ‘large-
cale land acquisitions’ by investors in developing countries
urfaced around 2007 (GRAIN, 2008). Since then, critical concerns
bout justice and local rights to land have been raised in rela-
ion to the phenomenon now widely referred to as ‘global land
rabbing’ (e.g. Behrman et al., 2012; Danial and Mittal, 2009;
e Schutter, 2011; Li, 2011; Margulis et al., 2013; Oxfam, 2011;
hite et al., 2012). A multitude of studies have provided valuablenowledge on the empirics of land grabbing, as well as its socio-
conomic and environmental impacts at the global, regional and
ocal level (e.g. Anseeuw et al., 2012; Borras et al., 2011; Deininger
∗ Corresponding author at: IRI THESys, Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Unter den
inden 6, 10099 Berlin, Germany.
E-mail address: cecilie.friis@hu-berlin.de (C. Friis).
ttp://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.landusepol.2016.05.028
264-8377/© 2016 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.et al., 2010; GRAIN et al., 2014; Nolte, 2014; Suhardiman et al.,
2015; Thondhlana, 2015; Zoomers, 2010). A central focus in this
research – as well as in media and activist circles – has been
the processes and mechanisms of large-scale and long-term land
acquisitions by ‘powerful’ foreign private and public investors in
so-called ‘weak states’. Indeed, the dominance of this focus has
resulted in the production of what Baird (2014b) labels the ‘global
land grab meta-narrative’. This narrative is underpinned by deﬁni-
tions of land grabbing adopted in, for example, global and regional
inventories that often only include land deals above a certain size,
generally 200 ha (Anseeuw et al., 2012; Anseeuw et al., 2013) or
1000 ha (Borras et al., 2012b; Cotula et al., 2009), as well as studies
predominantly focusing on formal acquisitions, purchases and con-
cessions with a duration of at least 30-50-99 years (e.g. Antonelli
et al., 2015; GRAIN et al., 2014; Nolte, 2014). However, studies
have begun to challenge this focus (e.g. Bräutigam and Zhang,
2013; Edelman and León, 2013; Locher and Sulle, 2014). By con-
textualising ‘land grabbing’ in ways that reveal the complexity of
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he processes and dynamics involved in contemporary transna-
ional land acquisitions such studies have contributed to moving
and grabbing research forward and demonstrated “the importance
f not fetishising particular global trends when examining local cir-
umstances” in ways that might “result in other less dominant but
xtremely important circumstances receiving insufﬁcient considera-
ion” (Baird, 2014b).
In this paper, we seek to contribute to these ongoing efforts.
s part of a larger research project exploring the implications of
elecoupled land use change (Eakin et al., 2014; Friis et al., 2015;
iu et al., 2013), the paper investigates a set of ‘small-scale land
cquisitions’ in the Lao People’s Democratic Republic (Lao PDR or
aos). Through an in-depth analysis of the processes and dynam-
cs of these acquisitions, we aim to challenge the preoccupation
ith large-scale and long-term land acquisitions that dominates
he discussions of land grabbing in the Laotian context. Within
he broader land grabbing debate, Laos has been identiﬁed as a
otspot for the type of large-scale and long-term land acquisitions
hat feed into the meta-narrative of global land grabbing (Cotula
t al., 2009; Deininger et al., 2010; GRAIN, 2008). Portrayed as a
ich natural resource frontier with abundant ‘idle’ or ‘marginal’
and and a ‘weak’ regulatory context, Laos has been described as
n attractive target country for ‘powerful’ foreign investors (Baird,
014a; Barney, 2009; Fold and Hirsch, 2009). At the same time, the
overnment of Laos (GoL) has actively sought foreign direct invest-
ents in natural resources and has granted vast tracts of land to
omestic, regional and international investors in the past decades
nder the umbrella of the national strategy for ‘Turning land into
apital’ (Dwyer, 2007; Schönweger et al., 2012; Schönweger and
llenberg, 2009). While the majority of leases and concessions are
elatively small, often less than ﬁve hectares, the large-scale state-
ranted land concessions above 1000 ha have by far attracted the
ost attention. Indeed, this is unsurprising since these constitute
9 percent of the total amount of land granted and have proven
o have severe land loss and detrimental socio-economic and envi-
onmental implications (Schönweger et al., 2012).
However, recent studies show how the land grabbing meta-
arrative in the Laotian context overlooks important processes
nd impacts of large-scale foreign land acquisitions and land
lienation in general (Baird, 2011; Friis et al., 2016; Gironde
t al., 2015; Gironde and Portilla, 2015; Kenney-Lazar, 2012;
chönweger and Messerli, 2015; Suhardiman et al., 2015). For
xample, Kenney-Lazar (2015) contests the ‘weaknesses’ of the Lao
tate vis-à-vis investors by demonstrating the importance of state
ower and legitimacy for the successful implementation of invest-
ent projects. Similarly, McAllister (2015) illustrates the scope
f local agency in land acquisition processes by demonstrating
ow farmers’ acts of ‘everyday forms of resistance’  can obstruct the
mplementation of large-scale plantations. Emerging evidence at an
ggregated level also attests to an increasing discrepancy between
he numbers of hectares formally conceded at the central state level
nd the actual amount of land taken into use by investors (Hett et al.,
015; Messerli et al., 2015; Schönweger and Messerli, 2015).
While these efforts have substantially deepened the under-
tanding of large-scale ‘land grabbing’ in Laos, more subtle forms
f land acquisitions in the form of smaller land leases have hith-
rto received much less attention, hindering important insights
nto the full range of processes leading to contemporary land loss
mong local people. There is thus a need for in-depth analysis of the
articularities of such land leases. Using the experience of Ban Sir-
moon, a small rural village in Muang Long district, Luang Namtha
rovince, we explore how two companies led by Chinese investors
uccessfully leased around 35 and 46 ha of land in 2010 from the
illagers on six-year contracts, and examine the implications of
he plantations for land use and land control in the villages. This
nalysis demonstrates that although the actors involved, the spa-olicy 57 (2016) 117–129
tial and temporal scale of the acquisitions and the implementation
processes differ from the land grabbing meta-narrative, the actual
land use change and the perceived implications of this change in
the village amount to a de facto ‘land grab’.
The paper begins by presenting recent theoretical discussions
within the land grabbing literature followed by a brief introduction
to the local setting and the methodology. The results subsequently
detail the boom in banana plantations in Muang Long district, the
land acquisition strategies adopted by the investors in Ban Siri-
moon and the land use change following the rapid implementation
of the plantations. Based on the notion of ‘control grabbing’ (Borras
et al., 2012a) and the ‘powers of exclusion’ framework (Hall et al.,
2011), we  then discuss the wider land grabbing implications of
these small-scale and short-term acquisitions. Finally, the paper
is rounded of by a conclusion.
2. Theoretical perspectives
The lack of any widely accepted deﬁnition of the term ‘land grab-
bing’ has been a key challenge in the scholarly debate around the
increase in transnational land acquisitions worldwide since 2008
(Cotula, 2012; Edelman, 2013; Oya, 2013; Teklemariam et al., 2015).
Nevertheless, the bulk of research and discussion have focused on
large-scale and long-term land acquisitions by foreign investors in
the developing world. ‘Land grabbing’ has therefore largely come to
be associated with a particular type of near permanent contractual
enclosures of large tracts of land from (poor) local users. How-
ever, as the academic discussions of ‘global land grabbing’ move
beyond what Edelman et al. (2013) label its initial ‘making sense
period’, scholars have called for critical theoretical, methodologi-
cal and empirical engagement with the phenomenon (Borras et al.,
2012b; Edelman et al., 2013; Hall et al., 2015; Scoones et al., 2013;
White et al., 2012). Such efforts have emphasised how the pre-
occupation with ‘powerful’ foreign actors, the ‘permanency’ and
spatial scale of acquisitions have resulted in a lack of appreci-
ation for the complex relations between the scales, actors and
processes in contemporary land grabbing dynamics. Consequently,
more recent studies have examined the complexity of land grab-
bing in various contexts by focusing on the distribution of power
and agency between local and foreign investors, smallholders, mid-
dlemen and state authorities (Beban and Gorman, 2015; Borras
and Franco, 2013; Smalley and Corbera, 2012; Sud, 2014), as well
as between foreign investors, state authorities and domestic elites
(Baird, 2014b; Bräutigam and Zhang, 2013; Wolford et al., 2013). It
has been shown that such relations not only depend on the scale
but also on the social, political and historical contexts in which any
speciﬁc deal takes place (Dwyer, 2014; Edelman and León, 2013).
Adding to this complexity, the purpose of the investment and for
farmland acquisitions the ‘nature of the crop’ have been shown to
inﬂuence actors’ ability to engage in or contest land grabbing. For
example, Hall (2011) draws upon the literature of Southeast Asian
crop booms to illustrate how crop characteristics including bio-
physical, labour and technical requirements mediate the capacity
of different actors to gain access to and control over land, as well
as inﬂuencing the actual outcome of a particular land acquisition.
A further ‘critique’ of the attention to large-scale acquisitions has
been raised by studies critically examining the relation between
the extent and outcomes of land acquisitions (Borras et al., 2012b;
Edelman et al., 2013). Such studies have shown that the amount
of land involved in acquisitions does not necessarily correspond to
actual dispossession and/or social and environmental conﬂicts on
site (e.g. Becker, 2013; Kandel, 2015). Furthermore, the discrepan-
cies between the hectares of acquired land reported in inventories
and media reports, and the ‘on the ground’ implementation of
land acquisitions have been widely documented (Edelman, 2013;
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malley and Corbera, 2012). This discrepancy has been attributed
o the grossly overstated availability of so-called ‘unused’ land in
any target countries (Exner et al., 2015), deviations between
tated and real investment objectives or abilities by investors
McCarthy et al., 2012), as well as an over-reporting of acquired
and areas by media sources, for example (Bräutigam and Zhang,
013).
These advancements in the understanding of contemporary
and grabbing have put the initial ‘fetishisation of the hectare’
Edelman, 2013) and ﬁxation on ‘permanency’ under pressure.
ome scholars have thus argued that the wide range of processes
esulting in land alienation and changing land control today is per-
aps better understood through the concept of ‘control grabbing’
Borras et al., 2012a; Margulis et al., 2013; Peluso and Lund, 2011).
or instance, Borras et al. (2012a) propose that “land grabbing is
ssentially ‘control grabbing’: grabbing the power to control land and
ther associated resources such as water in order to derive beneﬁt
rom such control” (p. 850). This concept adds a number of impor-
ant aspects to the discussion of land grabbing. First, it emphasises
hat a ‘land grab’ does not necessitate a complete and permanent
ispossession or enclosure of land from local users (Borras et al.,
012b; White et al., 2012); rather, control grabbing alludes to the
ractices that establish, consolidate and/or deny access to land for
ome period of time (Ribot and Peluso, 2003). This makes it possi-
le to shift focus from spatial and temporal scale as well as foreign
ersus domestic actors to the actual social, political, ecological and
istorical setting enabling particular land alienations. Second, it
ntroduces the notion that all forms of land access and control ulti-
ately imply some degree of exclusivity. As such, a land grab is ﬁrst
nd foremost possible when an actor can claim the exclusive rights
o use a particular piece of land in a particular way. Exclusivity, in
his sense, is not necessarily a matter of outright purchase or full
nclosure, but is determined by highly diverse claims to the right to
ontrol the use of a particular plot of land. Whereas the broader land
rabbing narrative often operates with a distinction between land
cquisitions by ‘economic’ and ‘extra-economic’ means − where
he former implies ‘voluntary’ market transfers and purchases and
he latter that some degree of illegitimacy, force or ‘theft’ is involved
Hall, 2013), Hall et al. (2011) have theorised how gaining access to
and can be a far more complex process. Understanding how land is
grabbed” in a particular case requires attention to an actor’s ability
o use a combination of four ‘powers of exclusion’ to grab control,
.e. regulation (the use of rules and policies employed by states and
ther powerful groups deﬁning for what and by whom land can be
sed), force (the use of violence or threats of violence to establish
nd maintain control over land), legitimation (the use of norma-
ive or principled arguments concerning how, by who  and for what
and is allocated or used) and market powers (the way that price of
and and/or inputs for farming provides opportunities or barriers
or people to access and use land) (Hall et al., 2011). The ‘pow-
rs of exclusion’ framework thus captures the negotiated aspect
n any kind of land acquisitions and highlights how the distinction
etween land grabs and land sales, leases, concessions and contract
arming arrangements is often blurred in reality. In the broader dis-
ussions about agrarian futures and large-scale versus small-scale
arming (i.e. Peters, 2013; White et al., 2012), the framework opens
p for engaging with all types of capitalisation of agriculture and
ommodiﬁcation of land, regardless of the size or shape, in order
o assess exclusionary and potentially detrimental effects.
These insights illustrate how analyses of (trans)national land
cquisitions leading to land alienation from local people must pay
ttention to the particularities of local contexts, as well as the
iversity of actors with varied and often complex agendas shap-
ng acquisitions. By building upon the conceptualisation of ‘control
rabbing’ and ‘powers of exclusion’, it becomes possible to address
 much wider range of ‘land grabbing’ processes than large-scaleolicy 57 (2016) 117–129 119
land acquisitions via long-term concessions. Instead, these notions
allow us to analyse land grabbing as a process essentially concern-
ing the right to exclude and control the use of land regardless of
the size of the plot involved. In this light, we analyse the dynam-
ics of the banana plantations that have rapidly increased in Muang
Long district since 2008. A central argument is that despite being
small-scale and short-term, these acquisitions in fact constitute
land grabs.
3. The local setting
3.1. Land management policies and concession implementation
in Laos
Since the establishment of the Lao PDR in 1975, the GoL
has carried out far-reaching land use planning and land zon-
ing policies to gain control over the country’s vast geographical
area (236,800 km2) and dispersed ethnically diverse population
(Lestrelin et al., 2012). In Laos, all land is by constitution under
the authority of the state and although the 2003 Land Law dis-
tinguishes between state and private land, most of the country’s
territory remains categorised as ‘state land’ (Ducourtieux et al.,
2005; Schönweger and Üllenberg, 2009). Since the late 1990s sev-
eral donor sponsored land reforms have however introduced land
titles for residential land in urban areas and permanent or tem-
porary certiﬁcates of use rights in rural areas (Lestrelin et al.,
2012). The policies aimed at controlling and zoning land for spe-
ciﬁc uses are inﬂuenced by the national goals for agricultural- and
natural resource-based economic development, in which grant-
ing state land leases and concessions for land and forest resources
to private investors have become a cornerstone. The various land
management efforts in Laos build upon an ofﬁcially applied dis-
tinction between the uplands and lowlands, which favours the
settled agricultural activities of lowland populations over the tradi-
tional shifting cultivation practices of upland minority populations
(Lestrelin, 2010; Lund, 2011). Land use planning, land reforms and
the internal resettlement of upland populations to the lowlands
have thus been used as tools to promote ‘desirable’ lowland agri-
culture, while stabilising or eradicating the ‘undesirable’ shifting
cultivation (Evrard and Goudineau, 2004; Fujita and Phanvilay,
2008; Lestrelin et al., 2012; Vandergeest, 2003). However, as argued
by Barney (2009), such land zoning, as well as the resettlement
of populations, has also facilitated a ‘freeing up of land and for-
est resources’ (p. 153) that can be granted to private investors
through state land leases and concessions. Coupled with the natural
resource-driven growth strategy, these land management policies
have led to a rapid and to some extent uncontrolled increase in land
leases and concessions granted at all government levels in Laos. In
order to gain more control over the concession granting process,
the GoL – in collaboration with several foreign donor partners – car-
ried out an inventory of all leases granted between 2007 and 2010.
Building upon this inventory data, Messerli et al. (2015) explore the
implementation processes of large-scale land acquisitions, showing
how foreign investors with strong relations to domestic elites have
been able to overrule land governance mechanisms and the interest
of local actors in the acquisition processes. However, less force-
ful modes of acquisition are recently beginning to emerge, mainly
because increasing land scarcity, competition between investors
and growing experience in dealing with land acquisitions among
local actors are compelling investors to engage in more bottom-
up strategies to accessing land. Although these more inclusive
processes provide some scope for policy interventions ensuring a
better consultation of local populations, for example, the negative
consequences of the concessions already in place prompt Messerli
et al. (2015) to suggest that future land policies should aim to
120 C. Friis, J.Ø. Nielsen / Land Use P
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lage supplemented the insights gained through formal interviews.
Semi-structured interviews were also carried out repeatedly at
the ﬁve government departments1 involved in agricultural invest-Fig. 1. Map  of Muang Long in Luang Namtha Province.
o beyond regulating or preventing land acquisitions per se, and
ather focus on “policies relevant to conﬂict resolution, labour issues,
nd outmigration as new drivers of poverty” (Messerli et al., 2015).
uhardiman et al. (2015) similarly argue that new land manage-
ent policies should take into account differentiated and hidden
ivelihood effects of land acquisitions.
.2. Rapid agricultural change in Northern Laos
In Luang Namtha province, the ﬁeld site for this study (see Fig. 1),
here has been an extensive agricultural transformation and com-
ercialisation over the past 15–20 years, strongly inﬂuenced by
he province’s close proximity to China. Political and economic
eforms in both Laos and China – including a transformation from
 planned to socialist market economy in the late-1980s, the re-
pening of the regional borders in the mid-1990s and a general
mprovement of road infrastructures – have deepened the formal
ntegration and regionalisation of the economy in the border region
Fox et al., 2009; Rigg, 2006; Thongmanivong et al., 2009). More-
ver, close ethnic and kinship relations across the border have
nabled informal economic interactions (Lagerqvist, 2013). Rubber
as, for example, introduced in the early-1990s by smallholders
ith cross-border family relations and is now a dominant cash-
rop (Sturgeon, 2013). Subsequently, small Chinese companies and
ndividual traders have promoted a range of cash-crops for export
n loose contractual arrangements or by establishing a market for
arious crops. With the expansion of cash-crop production, the
ompetition for and pressure on land are rising, especially in the
ertile lower-lying valley areas traditionally used for paddy rice
roduction.
.3. Ban Sirimoon, Muang Long District
Muang Long district, one of ﬁve districts in Luang Namtha
rovince, is among the poorest and least developed districts in
aos (pers. comm.  Provincial Agricultural and Forest Ofﬁcer, Luang
amtha, 28.04.2014). The landscape is characterised by a rugged
ountainous terrain and narrow river valleys, with the Mekongolicy 57 (2016) 117–129
River forming the district’s north-western border with Myanmar
and the main district road connecting the district centre with
Muang Sing – a main trading town and gateway to China – in the
east (Lagerqvist, 2013; see map  Fig. 1). The case study village Ban
Sirimoon is located approximately 30 km east of Muang Long town
on the main road to Muang Sing town. The majority of the village’s
66 households (323 people in August 2014) are Doi Samtao people,
a very small ethnic minority group; however, as Buddhists, they
share many cultural traits with the larger group of Tai Lue peo-
ple living in the area. Although the main language in the village is
the Samtao language, the majority of the villagers also speak ﬂu-
ent Tai Lue. The village territory includes a narrow strip of lowland
in the Nam Ma  River valley, as well as the hills on both sides of
the valley. Ban Sirimoon was  subject to the GoL’s Land Use Plan-
ning and Land Allocation programme in 2001, and the majority of
households received temporary use certiﬁcates for both upland and
lowland ﬁelds. The villagers are primarily engaged in subsistence
rice production with many households combining lowland paddy
rice production and rotational shifting cultivation of upland rice.
However, a development from subsistence- to market-oriented
livelihood strategies has taken place in recent years, prompted by
the introduction of a range of cash-crops by small Lao and Chinese
traders, including maize, cassava, rubber, pumpkin and sugarcane.
In 2010, the agricultural change accelerated as the villagers started
leasing land to two  Chinese banana investors.
4. Methodology
This paper emerged out of a larger research project exploring
the dynamics of distal ﬂows and drivers of local land use change,
now often referred to as telecoupling (i.e. socioeconomic and envi-
ronmental linkages between distant human-environment systems)
(Friis and Nielsen, 2014; Friis et al., 2015; Liu et al., 2013; Liu et al.,
2014). Within this context, the paper addresses one signiﬁcant
aspect of such distal linkages, namely foreign investments in land
and agricultural intensiﬁcation. In particular, we  address the ques-
tions of how investors gain access to land and what the perceived
implications of land acquisitions are among villagers in the case
study site.
The study draws upon data from ethnographic ﬁeld research
carried out in Muang Long district and Luang Namtha province
in April-May and August-December 2014 as well as June 2015.
Table 1 presents the main methods used, their quantitative density
and the key themes covered. For this paper, participant obser-
vation carried out throughout the ﬁeldwork, enabled building
up a rapport with the villagers to gain insights into their daily
activities and create trust for discussions of sensitive topics. Fur-
thermore, background information about household composition,
general livelihood characteristics and land use activities was  gained
through a household questionnaire survey with heads of house-
holds and/or their wives, randomly sampled from a list of all
village households. The questionnaire also provided insights into
household experience and participation in the banana plantation
development. Focus group and semi-structured interviews were
subsequently used to explore emerging themes in greater depth
and both group participants and individual interviewees were
selected to cover different gender, age and economic conditions.
Informal conversations enabled by the long-term stay in the vil-1 The Agricultural and Forestry Department; the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources; the Department of Planning and Investment; the Department of
Trade and Industry; and the Department of Social Welfare and Labour.
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Table  1
Synthesis of methods used, themes covered, data acquisition time and quantitative density.
Method Informants Themes covered Data acquisition
time
Place Quantitative density
Participant
observation
Daily life
Agricultural strategies and livelihood activities
Food security, income and expenses
Perception of change to agricultural and
livelihood opportunities
Banana plantation development
Labour arrangements in plantations
August to
December 2014
June 2015
Ban Sirimoon Continuous residence in
the village
Informal
interviews
Village authorities
Farmers
Perception of change to agricultural and
livelihood opportunities
Cash-crop developments
Banana plantation development
April to May  2014
August to
December 2014
June 2015
Long District
Ban Sirimoon
Continuously
Semi-structured
interviews
Banana middlemen
Land brokers
Role in relation to banana plantation
development
Land survey process
Implementation process
Perception of change to agricultural and
livelihood opportunities
General impact of banana
August to
December 2014
June 2015
Ban Sirimoon 12 interviews
Government
ofﬁcials at senior
level
Role in relation to banana plantation
development
Land survey process
Implementation process
Relationship with banana investors
General impact of banana
April to May  2014
August to
December 2014
June 2015
Luang Namtha
Province
Long District
27 interviews
Banana investors
Plantation
managers
Objectives for investment in banana in Laos
Land survey process
Implementation process
Relationship with villagers and GoL
departments
Banana plantation management
General impact of banana
November to
December 2014
June 2015
Long District 10 interviews (8 with
investors and 2 with
plantation managers)
Villagers Agricultural strategies and livelihood activities
Involvement and development of cash-crop
production
Perception of change to agricultural and
livelihood opportunities
June 2015 Ban Sirimoon 12 interviews with 17
villagers (incl. two  small
groups)
Household
questionnaire
survey
Head of households
and their wives
Household composition
Agricultural strategies and livelihood activities
Perception of change to agricultural and
livelihood opportunities
Banana plantation involvement
September to
November 2014
Ban Sirimoon 48 out of 66 households
interviewed
Random sample based on
list of households in village
Focus  group
discussions
Villagers Agricultural strategies and livelihood activities
Involvement and development of cash-crop
production
Perception of change to agricultural and
livelihood opportunities
September to
December 2014
June 2015
Ban Sirimoon 12 groups
3 to 8 participants
Differentiated according to
age, gender and main
agricultural activities
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cBanana plantation involvement
ents at the district and provincial level, and in the latter part of
he ﬁeldwork in 2014, semi-structured interviews were conducted
ith banana investors, banana plantation managers, middlemen
nd land brokers operating in the case study village and Muang
ong district in general. These semi-structured interviews provide
he primary source of data on the implementation of the planta-
ions. In June 2015, semi-structured interviews and focus group
iscussions were conducted with villagers and middlemen to fol-
ow up on speciﬁc themes. All interviews were conducted in Lao,
ai Lue or Chinese languages with the assistance of a translator and
hey were digitally recorded. The interviews were subsequently
ranscribed and translated into English before being coded using
SR Nvivo software. The subsequent analysis is therefore predom-
nantly based on qualitative interview data and observations. Direct
uotes used in the analysis have been corrected grammatically for
eadability and all names of informants and companies have been
hanged to ensure anonymity.5. Results
5.1. The boom in banana plantations
Commercial banana plantations started surfacing in Muang
Long district around 2008, when small-scale Chinese investors
began renting land and planting bananas for export to China.
According to investors and government ofﬁcers, the growing
demand for fresh fruit in China was the main driver for the expan-
sion. The availability of relatively cheap and good quality lands
in Laos with access to irrigation water coupled with favourable
climatic conditions was also highlighted and contrasted to the
situation in many banana producing regions of China that are
experiencing increasing problems with land degradation and the
‘Panama disease’ (Ordonez et al., 2015), as well as severe typhoon
risk. Plantation managers explained that a banana plant is generally
productive for three seasons of ten to fourteen months, after which
they need to be replanted. However, several investors noted that
due to the good land quality, the banana plants can be productive
for up to ﬁve growing-seasons, if managed properly.
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Mr.  Peng. Relying on his knowledge of the area, he engaged Mr.
Tang, a well-connected local businessman, as a middleman. Once
the suitable land in the case study village was  identiﬁed, Mr.  Tang22 C. Friis, J.Ø. Nielsen / Land
.1.1. The Muang Long banana investment scene
As of November 2014, the Muang Long District Agricultural
nd Forestry Ofﬁce (DAFO) had thirteen legally registered banana
nvestment companies on record, holding between 16.63 ha and
69.83 ha, in leases ranging from less than 1 ha to 61.87 ha. A total
f 820.75 ha of banana plantation was ofﬁcially registered at the
istrict. The investors include Chinese businessmen or small com-
anies with long-term trade experience in the area, Chinese joint
entures or joint ventures between Chinese and Lao business-
en  (often relatives), Chinese farmers or individual investors with
anana cultivation experience in China, as well as one large-scale
gro-business investor. Some of these investors have lived and done
usiness in Laos for several years, while others are married to Lao
omen and have gone into joint ventures with their fathers- and/or
rothers-in-law. Others again enter Laos on temporary visas and
order-passes, and do not take up residency in Laos. Instead, they
ely on hired Chinese plantation managers – often with banana
ultivation experience in China – to oversee the daily manage-
ent and cultivation. Several of the interviewed banana investors
nd plantation managers complained about the bureaucracy and
xpensive fees involved in obtaining work-permissions for the daily
anagers. According to the DAFO, three of the legally registered
ompanies act as intermediaries for other investors, who remain
nregistered and often absents from the plantation sites despite
eing the de facto plantation owners. The total number of banana
nvestors operating in the district is thus unknown. From interviews
ith villagers, middlemen and investors, as well as government
fﬁcers, the investors negotiate for access to land directly at village
evel, without initial involvement of the government authorities
ntil after ﬁnalising the contract. In some cases, investors pay
eposits for the land and start implementing the plantations before
pplying for permissions.
Due to the cultivation requirements, the investors target the
ccessible and fertile lowland areas used for paddy rice production.
s a result, there has been a rapid conversion of paddy ﬁelds to
anana plantations throughout Muang Long district, as well as in
eighbouring Muang Sing district. Since Luang Namtha province
s appointed a strategic rice producing region for Northern Laos,
he paddy to banana conversion has caused substantial discontent
t the Provincial Government, leading the Provincial Governor to
ssue a province-wide ban on new banana plantations on paddy
and in 2011. However, several district ofﬁcers stressed that the
nformal negotiation strategies employed by the investors coupled
ith the farmers’ economic incentive to lease out the land makes
t very difﬁcult to control the plantation development. Problems
ith corruption and patron-client relationships between several
nvestors and high-ranking district ofﬁcials were also indicated.
.2. Investor strategies for acquiring access to land
In late 2010, Ban Sirimoon was targeted by two banana invest-
ent companies. Both companies are legally registered with the
istrict authorities, although they represent two different investor
ypes. Based on the accounts of villagers, local middlemen and
lantation managers, the following sections explore the actors and
trategies involved in the land acquisition processes adopted by
he two companies, the contractual arrangements and the villagers’
xperiences with the process.
.2.1. The LFA Company
The LFA Company (henceforth the LFA) is a joint venture com-any owned by ﬁve Chinese shareholders of mixed ethnicity
ncluding Han, Yao, Tai Lue and Akha. Mr.  Ye – a Han Chinese
hareholder with many years of banana cultivation experience in
hina and Burma – explained that the company’s ethnic composi-olicy 57 (2016) 117–129
tion gave them a great advantage regarding language and cultural
understanding when negotiating for land in the region.
The Tai Lue Chinese shareholder Mr.  Peng, was in charge of sur-
veying the case study area and used his personal relations from
many years of watermelon cultivation in the area to engage local
middlemen. Mr.  Peng ﬁrst hired a well-connected local business-
man  and Tai Lue village naiban,2 Mr.  Kham, to ﬁnd suitable land
and establish contact to village gatekeepers. In Ban Sirimoon, Mr.
Kham approached his long-time ‘comrade’ and member of the vil-
lage authority, Mr.  Mai, hiring him as a village land broker. Mr.  Mai
was in charge of contacting households with land in the targeted
area and explained in an interview how he used his intimate knowl-
edge of the village to target the right households and encourage
them to lease their land to the LFA:
“I began to do land survey including the na3 land without water. I
told the landholders that we should grant the na to the Chinese investor
[. . .]  because otherwise we will not be able to plant anything because
there will be no water [when the plantation is established]” (Interview,
Mr.  Mai, 11.11.14).
Mr.  Mai  secured the land of nine households in the village and
was paid a fee of 800,000 LAK (1 USD ≈ 8,031 LAK4). Subsequently,
the LFA started clearing the land. However, some households
remained reluctant to join the contract and the LFA hired Mr.  Thon,
who worked as a day-to-day labourer for the company in the land
clearing process, to convince the remaining households to join the
contract:
“I did not force or lie or inﬂuence them to grant land to the banana
investor, I just approached them and mentioned the real reason [why
they should lease out the land] and tried to help them to analyse the
future potential problem which they will face if they keep land for own
cultivation because their land is located on the same plot as the banana
ﬁeld” (Interview, Mr.  Thon, 09.11.14).
Mr.  Thon was successful in securing the remaining hectares of
land and received a fee of 400,000LAK. Thirteen households thus
leased their land to the LFA in Ban Sirimoon, while adjacent land
farmed by neighbouring villages was also secured and the according
to the plantation manager the LFA plantation totals 35 ha.
In February 2015, the LFA plantation was  bought by another
joint venture of Chinese investors, who were expanding their
banana investments into Laos to take advantage of the good land
and water conditions. The sale was  negotiated directly between the
investors with no involvement of the district or village authorities
and while the new joint venture had taken over the contract with
the villagers, they continued to rely on the LFA’s legal registration
and investment permission.
5.2.2. The XG Company
The second company – the XG Company (henceforth the XG) –
is owned by Mr.  Xao Gi, a Han Chinese businessman with a long his-
tory of agricultural and business investments in both Muang Long
and Muang Sing districts. In addition to investing directly in banana
plantations, the XG operates as one of the intermediaries facilitat-
ing land acquisitions and plantation implementation on behalf of
other investors. When targeting Ban Sirimoon in 2010, the XG was
operating on behalf of a private Chinese investor.
Mr.  Xao Gi used a similar land surveying strategy as the LFA’s2 Naiban is Lao word for the village headman.
3 Na is the Lao word for ‘lowland paddy rice land’.
4 The Bureau of Fiscal Services, US department of Treasury, exchange rate
31.12.2010 https://www.ﬁscal.treasury.gov/fsreports/rpt/treasRptRateExch/1210.
pdf.
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pproached Mr.  Chai—an entrepreneurial farmer in Ban Sirimoon
nd old employee of Mr.  Tang’s. Encouraged by Mr.  Tang, Mr.  Chai
ompiled a list of all the relevant households in the village and
sked the village naiban to call for a general meeting:
“He [the Naiban] mobilised the meeting for me, and I told them [the
illagers] the rate of leasing fee and duration of the contract and then
hey discussed with each other for some days. Then I went back to visit
hem again to note down all the households who wanted to grant land
o the banana plantation. Some time after the meeting, maybe 1–2
eeks, I got their ﬁnal agreement”  (Interview, Mr.  Chai, 08.11.14).
The plantation investor paid a land survey fee of 50 RNB (1
SD = 6.67 RNB5) per mu6 to Mr.  Tang, while Mr. Chai received 200
NB per hectare (13.3 RNB per mu). The XG plantation totals 46 ha
ithin the territory of Ban Sirimoon and 70 ha in the area in general.
n Ban Sirimoon, six households joined the XG contract, while the
est of the land was farmed by households in neighbouring villages.
Following some disputes with landholders in another village in
he area, the original investor sold the plantation after one year of
ultivation. Again, the sale was conducted without the involvement
f village or district authorities and the new investor still relies on
he legal registration of the XG Company.
.2.3. Contractual arrangements
After ﬁnalising the agreements with the villagers, both compa-
ies set up contracts in April 2011. Mr.  Thon signed the LFA contract
n behalf of the households in the village and kept a copy of the
ontract. The XG contract was signed by the village naiban and no
ritten record of it was  found in the village or elsewhere. The vil-
agers ‘signed’ with their ﬁngerprint upon receiving the ﬁrst land
easing fee, whereby none of them had received copies of the con-
racts. According to the local middlemen, the contracts are similar
or both companies: they state the annual land leasing fee of 10mio
AK per hectare and the yearly payment date in April. The leasing
eriod is limited to six years until April 2017, with the possibility
f an extension for another six years. This extension will depend
n the investors’ willingness to continue farming banana in the
rea, as well as a renegotiation of the leasing fee. No agreement
n the responsibilities of investors regarding land restoration upon
ermination of the leasing period is found in the contracts.
.2.4. Villagers’ experiences with the acquisition process
Sixteen of the nineteen households involved with the banana
nvestors in Ban Sirimoon participated in the household question-
aire survey. On average, these households had leased out 0.93 ha
f land (ranging from 0.2 to 1.44 ha) that had mainly been used for
addy rice (12 out of 16 surveyed households) with the rest used for
ugarcane, vegetable gardens or young fallow. All of the surveyed
ouseholds involved stated that they had temporary user certiﬁ-
ates for their land. For the majority of the households involved,
he leased land constituted their entire paddy rice landholding and
hey now relied on upland rice cultivation, as well as cash-crop
roduction of sugarcane, pumpkin or cassava. Six households had
addy plots for rice production left in addition to the land leased
o the banana plantations.
As indicated by accounts of the different middlemen, the local
and brokers of the two companies approached the households in
lightly different ways. While Mr.  Mai  and Mr.  Thon, on behalf of
he LFA, generally went directly to the targeted households, Mr.
hai called a general meeting at the Naiban’s house on behalf of
5 The Bureau of Fiscal Services, US department of Treasury, exchange rate
1.12.2010 https://www.ﬁscal.treasury.gov/fsreports/rpt/treasRptRateExch/1210.
df.
6 The Chinese measure mu corresponds to 614.4 m2 and in the local context
armers and investors calculate at 15 mu to 1 hectare.olicy 57 (2016) 117–129 123
the XG. In both cases, the involved households indicated, during
focus group discussions and individual interviews, that the pro-
posals had been discussed both within and between households
before being accepted. Several villagers stated, however, that they
had only participated silently in these discussions, and had sub-
sequently followed the general decision among the households to
accept the lease arrangement.
When inquiring into the reasons for leasing out the land, both
the local middlemen and villagers also mentioned that the targeted
land had suffered from a periodic lack of water, which restricted
the paddy rice cultivation and sometimes resulted in water-sharing
conﬂicts between villagers. In light of this, several villagers noted
that the land leasing fees were substantially higher than the pos-
sible income from the sale of surplus rice pointing to the strong
economic incentive to enter into the banana contracts. Moreover,
many villagers indicated that leasing land to the banana investors
was perceived as ‘earning money without working’ and the fees
indeed enabled people to invest in house improvements, small
business ventures or new goods, especially motorbikes. Others
indicated, however, that some households spent the new income
“inappropriately” resulting in lack of means to buy rice once their
supply of upland rice ran out. The plantations generated some
employment opportunities for daily wage work, especially in the
peak-cultivation periods, though mainly for young and abled-
bodied villagers. Aside from these economic incentives, villagers of
all age and economic status groups often stated that ‘we just have
to follow the society’s development’ when talking about the banana
developments. People stressed that entering into new forms of agri-
cultural activities was pertinent for their village’s development,
reﬂecting a sentiment actively used by several of the interviewed
investors as a legitimising argument for getting people to accept
their proposals.
However, several villagers stressed that despite the economic
incentives, they had also felt pressured by the investors and village
land brokers to accept the deals. During a household questionnaire
interview, one farmer explained:
“Most of the neighbouring land was already granted, and the other
villagers also wanted to grant their land, so I just had to follow them.
Also we would have a water-sharing problem [with the plantation],
if we were the only ones who farmed na in that area” (Household
questionnaire #37, 04.10.14).
Another farmer mentioned that the middleman had put his
name on the list of households with land in the targeted area and
thus he felt socially obliged to agree to the proposal, although he
would have preferred not to. Others mentioned that the middle-
men  had threatened that the chemical impacts of the plantations,
as well as the lack of access to ﬁelds and water would make it impos-
sible or very difﬁcult to continue with paddy rice cultivation after
the plantation implementation. Some villagers mentioned cases of
households from other villages having their rice seedlings ‘acci-
dently’ ploughed up or their ﬁeld huts bulldozed by investors, thus
forcing them to lease their land to the banana investors. Only a cou-
ple of households successfully refused to lease out their land and
now held paddy rice ﬁelds in the middle of the banana plantation
(see Fig. 2). One of these households experienced severe erosion
in their ﬁeld due to the mechanical tilling of the plantation. Six
of the interviewed households indicated that they initially refused
the investors’ proposal before ﬁnally giving in due to threats of
pollution, accessibility and social pressure.
5.3. Rapid implementation and land use changeBoth banana investors started implementing the plantations in
early 2011. In general, the two plantations use similar cultiva-
tion practices: they start by clearing the land, tilling it into deep
ditches using heavy machinery, before planting rows of banana
124 C. Friis, J.Ø. Nielsen / Land Use Policy 57 (2016) 117–129
Fig. 2. Top left: Newly tilled banana plantation with water pipes, Muang Long district, June 2015. Top right: Replanted banana palms in the LFA plantation, June 2015. Mid
l avel ro
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aeft:  Bananas ready for harvest in the LFA plantation, November 2014. Mid  right: Gr
ottom  left: Banana fruits covered with protection plastic, Muang Long district, Aug
he  one household that refused to join the plantation scheme in Ban Sirimoon, Nov
eedlings and building new irrigation systems (see Fig. 2). Chemi-
al fertilisers and a range of pesticides, herbicides, fungicides and
rowth-enhancers are sprayed heavily in the ﬁrst growing months
nd more moderately during the ripening of the fruit. Several lay-
rs of plastic and paper are used as insulation to protect the fruit
gainst pests and cool temperatures during the cold, dry seasonad, water pipes and left-over plastic insulation in the XG plantation, October 2014.
14. Bottom right: View of the XG banana plantation with an isolated paddy ﬁeld of
 2014 (Photos: by author).
months from November to January. In the XG plantation, a small
network of gravel roads and footpaths was also established.
When asked about the greatest impact of the plantations on
their village, the villagers highlighted the rapid land use change
and associated land degradation, particularly chemical pollution.
Some farmers reported that crops growing adjacent to the planta-
tions had been damaged by the chemicals, while others expressed
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oncern for the long-term impacts to the soil. Several people men-
ioned that breathing and sleeping problems often followed the
praying of chemicals in the plantations.
In addition, the banana roots, plastic waste and the gravel stone
oads worried the villagers. Consequently, many people expressed
oncern that they would be unable to ‘turn back the land’– as it
as often expressed – to other agricultural uses after the end
f the contracts. The lack of clear assignment of responsibilities
or land restoration in the contracts contributed to these worries.
illagers as well as district ofﬁcers expressed concern that the
nvestors might leave the plantations before the contract ﬁnished
nd without restoring the land. The plantation manager in the XG
lantation noted that up to 60 trees had already been infected with
he Panama disease in the Ban Sirimoon plantation. One DAFO ofﬁ-
er also explained that there had been several examples of investors
oing bankrupt and ‘taking-off in the middle of the night’, leaving the
osting villages with the task of cleaning and restoring the land.
Moreover, the clearing and tilling process in both plantations
ntailed the destruction of the paddy rice irrigation system of chan-
els and sluices, as well as the traditional plot borders. While some
ouseholds had invested in stone land markers and installed them
rior to the implementation, the majority had not. The former vil-
age naiban articulated this concern:
“There are no problems at the moment, but maybe problems will
ome after the contract is over because they [landholders] will have
roblems with land borderline, for sure they will have problems with
his, because the Chinese destroyed all the previous land borderlines”
Interview, Mr.  Tong, 12.11.14).
As a result of the combined concerns over land degradation and
estroyed plot borders, most of the households involved stated that
hey expected to accept a contract extension offer from the banana
nvestors if the leasing fee were raised to reﬂect the rising land
rices in the area.
Finally, several villagers expressed concerns about the general
xpansion of banana plantations in the district, leading to an overall
ecline in rice production. Even for households, who  had leased out
ow producing paddy ﬁelds, the production of rice from these ﬁelds
ad constituted a considerable part of their food supply, and in gen-
ral villagers were increasingly relying on purchased rice leading
o substantial concerns with rising rice prices. These concerns were
ggravated in the spring of 2015 when a new large banana planta-
ion was established on some very productive rice paddies in three
eighbouring villages.
. Discussion
.1. A case of successful ‘control grabbing’
Recent advancements in the land grabbing literature have begun
o challenge the meta-narrative of ‘global land grabbing’ and espe-
ially critiqued the predominant focus on large-scale and long-term
and acquisitions (e.g. Edelman, 2013; Kandel, 2015) by so-called
powerful’ foreign corporate and government investors (e.g. Baird,
014b; Beban and Gorman, 2015; Shohibuddin et al., 2015). While
his early focus is unsurprising in light of the extent and pace of the
eported land rush in the aftermath of the global food and ﬁnancial
risis in 2007-8 (Anseeuw et al., 2012; Deininger et al., 2010), as
ell as the severe poverty and justice implications of many large-
cale land acquisitions (De Schutter, 2011; Messerli et al., 2013;
lwig et al., 2015; Shete and Rutten, 2015; Thondhlana, 2015),
ecent advancements in the literature has highlighted that adopt-
ng the concept of ‘control grabbing’ makes it possible to approach
and grabbing as something more than near permanent and large-
cale concessions or illegitimate expropriation of land (Borras et al.,
012a). Additionally, turning analytically towards the ways inolicy 57 (2016) 117–129 125
which actors combine various exclusionary powers to establish
and maintain control over land enables us to analyse highly vari-
able processes of land alienation in particular contexts (Hall et al.,
2011) thus revealing the blurred lines between land acquisitions
by ‘economic’ and ‘extra-economic’ means (Hall, 2013). Supposedly
‘straight-forward’ market transfers, purchases or leases of land are,
as our case study illustrate, often wrought with pressures of force
and legitimation. Based on these insights, it becomes possible to
analyse the banana plantations in Muang Long district as potential
land grabs.
While the banana plantations substantially differ on several
accounts from the state-granted large-scale land concessions cur-
rently dominating the literature on ‘land grabbing’ in Laos, they
essentially lead to the same outcome for local farmers, namely a
loss of land to foreign investors. As such, the ﬁndings of this study
question the importance of scale, spatial as well as temporal, as
the key factor in terms of understanding contemporary land grab-
bing. First, the investors driving the banana boom are not the large
regional or multinational corporations involved in land acquisitions
elsewhere in Laos (Baird, 2010; Kenney-Lazar, 2012), but rather
private businessmen and small-scale companies local to the bor-
derland region. This intimate knowledge of the area has allowed
them to take advantage of the new investment opportunity pre-
sented by the increased demand for bananas in China, because land
could be identiﬁed and obtained relatively quickly. The banana cul-
tivation thus to some extent represents a continuation of the long
historical, social and economic cross-border interactions between
Luang Namtha Province and China’s southern districts (Lagerqvist,
2013; Sturgeon, 2013). Second, the limited spatial extent and tem-
poral scope of the banana plantations can be partly attributed to
the ‘nature of the crop’ (Hall, 2011). The technical requirements
for the banana cultivation compel the investors to target the rela-
tively ﬂat and easily accessible lowlands along roads and rivers. In a
landscape characterised by rugged terrain and narrow river valleys,
larger continuous plots of lowland land are difﬁcult to ﬁnd, thus
limiting the spatial extent of individual plantations. Regarding the
temporal scale of the acquisitions, the short-term growing season
of the banana plants – i.e. 10–14 months with 3–5 crop cycles per
banana seedling – renders six-year short-term lease arrangements
suitable for investors. The potential for extending the contracts
after the six years also allows the investors to take advantage of
the good soil quality, while maintaining ﬂexibility in light of the
risk of the Panama disease and the potential for land degradation.
Despite the limited scale of the individual plantations, the
banana acquisitions have substantial implications at the local level:
most notably, they are considerable in size compared to local
landholdings. For the involved households, the banana plantations
occupy a sizeable share of the paddy rice area, thus entailing a
rather widespread land use conversion when aggregated at the vil-
lage or district level. As a result, villagers and government ofﬁcials
alike are beginning to express concerns about an overall decline
in the rice production in the district. Similar results have been
shown in cases of small- to medium-sized land acquisitions in var-
ious places in Africa (Becker, 2013; Hilhorst et al., 2011; Kandel,
2015), underscoring that the implications of the spatial scale of
acquisitions are highly context-dependent. The relativity of the
magnitude of acquisitions vis-à-vis the extent and importance of
local land assets are thus key to assessing the consequences of land
acquisitions (Cotula, 2012).
Furthermore, where studies have revealed the hierarchical and
top-down implementation processes for at least the early stages
of state-granted land acquisitions in the Laotian context (Messerli
et al., 2015) as well as the importance of investors’ relations to the
Lao state (Kenney-Lazar, 2015), the case of the LFA and the XG com-
panies in Ban Sirimoon shows how the banana investors are able to
circumvent the formal involvement of government authorities by
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elying on more informal acquisition strategies. The extensive use
f personal relations and ‘snowballing’ techniques made it possi-
le for these companies to set up networks of local middlemen and
and brokers acting as gatekeepers to the village. In relation to this,
he long-term residency of some of the Chinese investors in Laos, as
ell as the joint ventures between relatives, i.e. sons- and fathers-
n-law, enabled companies to act fast and seek the opportunities
or expanding into banana without ofﬁcial investment permission.
he story of the XG Company also illustrates how the intermediary
ole adopted by some of the locally knowledgeable investors has
rovided access to these networked strategies for new investors
ho are unfamiliar with the area.
The accounts of the local middlemen as well as the villagers in
an Sirimoon allude to the intermingling of the powers of exclusion
 market demands with legitimation and force – in the investors’
egotiation strategies. Up front the banana leases appear to be
riven by market powers: The relatively low price and good qual-
ty of land in Laos drive the interest of the banana investors and
onverge with the economic incentives for villagers to lease out the
and, given the relatively high leasing fees compared to the few cash
ncome opportunities in the village. The argumentation used by
he middlemen also drew distinctly on these economic incentives.
owever, while the villagers to some extent conﬁrm the inﬂuence
f the market forces, their stories also reveal how the economic
ncentives were supported and reinforced by the extensive use of
egitimising arguments, as well as force or threats thereof. The mid-
lemen used strong legitimising arguments in their emphasis on
he plantations’ provision of ‘stable’ incomes from leasing fees and
mployment opportunities in the plantations. Such legitimisations
esonate with the ofﬁcial Lao land management policies and their
mphasis on bringing settled agricultural activities to rural areas
Lestrelin, 2010; Rigg, 2005), and furthermore play into the vil-
agers’ expressed desires to ‘follow the society’s development’. In
ddition, the extensive use of local middlemen contributed to a
eneral legitimation of the investors’ agenda by introducing a level
f intimacy in the negotiations with landholding households. In
an Sirimoon, the village land brokers created an atmosphere of
ocial peer pressure, making it uncomfortable for some villagers to
efuse. Finally, the unsuccessful resistance of six households to the
lantation proposals illustrates how investors used direct force by
estroying rice seedlings or cutting off access to ﬁelds, as well as
ndirect force in the form of threats concerning the succeeding land
egradation, chemical pollution to crops and loss of water access
o persuade households to lease out land. Employing the frame-
ork of exclusionary powers provide an analytical entry point for
nderstanding these informal strategies.
In Ban Sirimoon, the intimate and networked land acquisi-
ion strategies coupled with the use of exclusionary power made
t possible for the investors to ensure a rapid and successful
mplementation of the plantations: something that has proven
ncreasingly difﬁcult for the large-scale formal concession projects
n Laos (Hett et al., 2015; Messerli et al., 2015; Schönweger and
esserli, 2015). Moreover, the subsequent swift land use con-
ersion was central for the investors’ ability to establish and
onsolidate control over the land. According to the contracts, the
nvestors have no responsibilities for restoring the land to its previ-
us uses and most of the involved households are thus considering
xtending the initial contracts beyond the six years to avoid hav-
ng to deal with re-establishing their ﬁelds. While it is too soon to
ssess the full and long-term consequences of the banana boom
n Muang Long district, the susceptibility of monocropped banana
lantations to the Panama disease and long-term soil depletion, as
ell as the risk of general market-price drops, render the banana
nvestments vulnerable to the type of sudden crashes known from
ther crop booms in Southeast Asia (Hall, 2011). Whereas investors
re generally free to move to uninfected land elsewhere or seekolicy 57 (2016) 117–129
alternative investment opportunities, local farmers are left to deal
with land that – while not necessarily being permanently destroyed
– requires difﬁcult and costly restoration (See e.g. Hall et al., 2011).
These threats contribute to the potential longer-term implications
of the banana acquisitions and illustrate that “while the ‘grab’ itself
is important, it only marks the beginning of a process of gaining (or
grabbing) access [to land]” (Peluso and Lund, 2011).
Overall, the banana leases in Ban Sirimoon and Muang Long dis-
trict can be characterised as ‘small-scale land acquisitions’ with
limited spatial reach and involving short-term and temporary allo-
cations of use rights. Based on these characteristics, they would for
example disqualify for inclusion by the criteria of many inﬂuen-
tial ‘land grabbing’ deﬁnitions used by the global land acquisition
inventories (e.g. Anseeuw et al., 2012), and would hence not fea-
ture in the statistics used by many as a basis for discussions of the
scale, scope and processes involved in ‘global land grabbing’. How-
ever, as our ﬁndings show, the combined effects of the land use
conversion and the cultivation practices in the plantations create a
lock-in of land use, which represents a strong ‘control grab’ of the
land. While the banana acquisitions do not lead to permanent dis-
possession of the villagers involved, the immediate and potential
longer-term alienation of the land facilitated by the use of force-
ful acquisition strategies nonetheless qualify them as land grabs.
A growing number of studies have similarly engaged with other
types of commoditisation of land and capitalisation of the agricul-
tural production to show the various ways in land loss or loss of
autonomy over land use decisions takes place around the world
today (Cramb et al., 2015; Vicol, 2015; Woods, 2015). Our  ﬁndings
support such studies in providing a critical contexts for claims in the
broader debate on possible agrarian futures that presents contract
farming, smallholder outgrower schemes and land management
contracts as better alternatives to large-scale land acquisitions (i.e.
Deininger, 2011; Vermeulen and Cotula, 2010).
From a broader policy perspective, these perspectives hold
implications for discussions concerning how to design adequate
policies to abate the consequences of land loss among local com-
munities. Messerli et al. (2015) have illustrated how increasing
land scarcity and competition between investors are giving rise
to more inclusive modes of acquisition processes in Laos, with a
stronger involvement of local authorities and communities in the
implementation of new investment projects. While the banana
acquisitions in Muang Long district somewhat exemplify such
emerging processes, our ﬁndings also highlight some of the dif-
ﬁculties and remaining pitfalls related to attempts to regulate land
acquisition processes in Laos. First, the informal negotiation pro-
cesses and the rapid implementation of banana plantations make
it difﬁcult for the authorities to intervene in plantation projects,
especially in the cases where investors pay deposits to villagers
upfront. The use of intermediaries as well as the sales and resales
of plantations between investors create additional confusion and
a lack of transparency for both villagers and district authorities,
thus adding further complexity to any efforts towards monitoring
the banana development. Second, the current attempts at regulat-
ing the banana boom have not had much effect to date, despite
government authorities and villagers expressing concern regard-
ing the decline of rice production. The provincial decree to prohibit
banana acquisitions of paddy rice ﬁelds has largely failed, partly
due to corruption and non-compliance among district authorities,
but also since the short-term economic gains for both villagers and
investors outweigh any concerns for potential reprisals. For many
villagers, the pressure to secure increasing cash income in the short
run also leads to the strategic pursuit of opportunities to commer-
cialise agricultural activities despite the acknowledged potential
for severe land degradation and other environmental problems.
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. Conclusion
The scholarly debate on ‘land grabbing’ is advancing, with an
nhanced understanding of mechanisms of contemporary land
rabbing being achieved through recent in-depth theoretical and
mpirical engagements with the actors, scales and processes
nvolved in various forms of land acquisitions. Part of the endeavour
as been to begin a critical discussion of the challenges and limita-
ions of the ‘global land grab meta-narrative’ (Baird, 2014b) and its
ocus on large-scale and long-term acquisitions by ‘powerful’ cor-
orate actors. Accordingly, this paper has aimed to contribute to
hese ongoing efforts by exploring the case of Chinese banana plan-
ation investments in Ban Sirimoon, Laos. The banana investments
ncountered there represent an illustrative example of an emerging
orm of ‘small-scale land acquisitions’ that differs from the large-
cale state-granted land concessions dominating the literature on
land grabbing’ in Laos.
Our study demonstrates how the banana acquisitions are
imited in both their spatial extent and temporal contractual
rrangements. The small-scale investors driving these acquisitions
ave long-term trade experience and social relations in the area.
his allows them to set up networks of middlemen and local land
rokers, making it possible to avoid the formal involvement of
overnment authorities in the land acquisition process. In Ban Siri-
oon, the two banana companies’ use of local middlemen and land
rokers ensured a successful negotiation of leasing contracts and
 rapid implementation of the plantations. Using the ‘powers of
xclusion’ framework to analyse the land acquisition strategies,
he study reveals how the investors – and by extension the local
and brokers – mix  ‘economic’ and ‘extra-economic’ means to gain
ccess to the land. Furthermore, the study illustrates how the land
se change and associated destruction of plot borders, irrigation
ystems and accessibility to water coupled with the land degrada-
ion from erosion and heavy use of chemical inputs create a lock-in
f land use. Despite the limited spatial and temporal scale of the
lantations, the land use conversion that they entail thus repre-
ents a rather strong and longer-term ‘control grab’ of the land from
revious users. From a policy perspective, these ﬁndings highlight
he importance of creating a better understanding of how highly
iverse forms of land acquisitions shape the alienation of land from
ocal users in Laos and elsewhere.
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